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Idaho is known as the Whitewater State.  It includes thousands of miles of navigable whitewater, 
ranging from steep creeks to big rivers with huge rapids. Some of the big rivers have become especially 
well-known and rafting on four of the most popular stretches of these rivers is regulated during peak 
season by the U.S. Forest Service via the Four Rivers Lottery. To raft these river sections during the 
peak season, rafters must submit an application for a permit, and the permits are then allocated by 
computer lottery for the upcoming rafting season.     
 
There are at least 12 stretches of rivers in the west, for which rafting permits are distributed in this way, 
and most western states hold lotteries to allocate permits for hunting one or more big game species 
(Buschena, Anderson, and Leonard, Loomis 1982, Nickerson).  Lotteries come in many forms, but they 
are not the only way of allocating rights for natural resource use.  Noncommercial permits to raft the 
Grand Canyon of the Colorado River are allocated by a waiting list,  although as of December 2003 the 
National Park Service placed a hold on adding names to the 8,000+ waiting list, and are considering 
alternative allocation schemes (Grand Canyon National Park).
2  Rationing permits strictly by price is an 
alternative that tends to be good at getting permits to the right people, but it is rarely used as the 
primary distribution mechanism for these types of resources, often because of protest about the 
inequity associated with a pricing system  (Sandrey, Buccola, and Brown, Loomis 1980).  Those with 
higher incomes are more likely to obtain the permits, and this is in conflict with the idea that everyone 
should have equal access to natural resources. 
 
As is usually the case with lotteries for the use of natural resources, once the permits are allocated by 
the Four Rivers Lottery they are not transferable; the permit holder must be on the raft trip for the permit 
to be valid.   This restriction is enforced, too; a Forest Service official verifies the permit holder’s identity 
at the river put-in site, and Forest Service officials may review permits at any point along the river.  
Financial penalties are issued for rafters without a valid permit.
3    Standard economic logic suggests 
that allowing permit trading, even after the permits have been allocated by lottery, would increase 
welfare among rafters by allowing those who value rafting trips most highly to buy a permit from lottery 
winners who care less about rafting.   In this article, we examine why this market restriction might have 
been imposed, and whether it should be. 
 
In the next section, we begin by examining some of the important characteristics of the rafting 
environment and the current Four Rivers permit allocation system.  We then hypothesize why the 
Forest Service  imposes  this market restriction.    Next,  we  informally  compare  the expected value to 
                                                 
1 The authors are assistant professors, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Washington State 
University, Pullman, WA 99164. 
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2In contrast, Loomis 1980 reports that in 1976 there were 425 applications for 36 permits to float the Grand 
Canyon, which were at that time apparently allocated by lottery. Demand for white water rafting has exploded 
since then. 
3 On the other hand, enforcement is undoubtedly not perfect, and there are other ways of buying your way onto 
the river.   It may take nothing but some spare time at the put-in and a few cases of beer for a non-permit holder 
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rafters of the permits with and without a post-lottery permit market.   We conclude with a discussion 
about the efficacy of prohibiting a secondary permit market. 
 
Rafting Permits and the Allocation Process 
 
The Middle Fork of the Salmon, the Main Fork of the Salmon, the Upper Selway, and Hells Canyon of 
the Snake River are all situated in the mid-section of Idaho (Figure 1).   A permit is required to float 
these stretches during the most popular times of year, roughly between early June and late July, which 
coincides with high water periods for each river.  These river stretches provide some of the most 
desirable multi-day river trips in the world, with big sandy beaches for camping, excellent fishing, and 
beautiful scenery.  The early season provides big, fast, and challenging whitewater for adrenaline 
junkies, and the late season provides a more relaxing, sunny, warm float, with milder rapids and crystal-
clear water for the more laid-back crowd.  Rafters highly value these rivers for recreation.  Consumer 
surplus estimates calculated in 1969 by Michalson for recreation on the Middle Fork of the Salmon 
average approximately  $385 per day or to just over $2300 for a six-day trip when inflated to 2003 
dollars.  This compares to a six-day commercially run raft trip on the Middle fork of the Salmon, which 
costs approximately $1,500 or more per person, depending on the outfitter.
4  This amount does not 
include the costs of getting to the rivers (which, by the way, can be quite an excursion in itself) or the 




Figure 1:  Idaho and the 4 stretches of river under the 4 Rivers Lottery. 
Source: http://www.ioga.org/riverssearch.htm 
                                                 
4 These raft trips include various services provided by the outfitters, so this market price is not strictly related to 
the willingness to pay for a private permit. Western Economics Forum, April 2004 
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In their bid to win a permit in the private (noncommercial) lottery, rafters submit an application that may 
list up to four choices ranked for specific rivers and dates, along with a $6 application fee.  After the 
January 31 deadline, a random drawing for applicant’s names occurs.   When a name is drawn, the 
applicant is issued a permit for their first choice river and date if it is available.  If the first choice is not 
available, review of the remaining choices occurs until a permit is issued or all four choices are 
determined to be unavailable.  Random drawings occur until the full quota of permits are issued (Martin, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture).  This permit allocation system was instituted in 1987, in response to 
high demand replacing various allocation systems for these stretches of river  (Martin).   Today, much 
more so than a couple of decades ago, demand for permits far outweighs permit availability: 15,357 
applications were submitted for the 1076 permits allotted for the 2003 season.  This equates to an 
average 7% chance of obtaining a permit.  Table 1 contains summary statistics for the Four Rivers 
Lottery for the 2000-2002 seasons. Clearly, given the cost of a raft trip, more rafters positively value 
rafting permits than are available.   
 
 
Table 1. Numbers of applications submitted and permits allocated  
for the Four Rivers Lottery, average for 2000-2002. 
   Submitted Allotted % 
  Main Salmon  2,646  285  10.8 
  Middle Fork Salmon  9,508  351  3.7 
  Hell's Canyon, Snake  807  327  40.5 
  Selway 1,755  62  3.5 
  Total 14,715  1,025  7.0 
 





Why Might the Forest Service have a lottery and Prohibit a Secondary Market?    
Loomis (1980) compares the level of efficiency under a pricing versus a lottery allocation method for 
permits in Westwater Canyon of the Colorado River, and concludes that a pricing mechanism would 
provide the greatest efficiency but is less equitable than a lottery.  Nonetheless, the idea that everyone 
should have equal access to government-regulated resources has been a part of the recreation culture 
for at least the last century, and the objectives of the Forest Service (as molded in part by the interests 
of stakeholders) clearly play a role in the allocation process used for the four rivers permits.  The use of 
lotteries for allocating resources is one way to minimize the perception that some receive preferential 
treatment or easier access than others. 
 
We hypothesize further that the Forest Service intends to direct the rents associated with rafting 
permits to the users of the resource services themselves.  By prohibiting a post-lottery market for 
permits, nonrafters have no incentive to apply for a permit, and rafters are protected from losing a 
portion of the rents from the resource to profit-seeking nonrafters. Rafters are an interest group 
concentrated on this specific type of resource (of which these rivers are an important and unique 
component), and are likely to have a great deal of influence on the managers of the permit system 
(Becker).   
 Western Economics Forum, April 2004 
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Expected benefits with and without a post-lottery permit market 
To shed light on the economic effects of a post-lottery market restriction, we compare the expected 
value of rafting permits to rafters under three scenarios:  1) the status quo, in which no secondary 
market is allowed, 2) a scenario in which only “rafters” are allowed to apply to win a permit by lottery but 
are then allowed to buy and sell permits afterward, and 3) a scenario in which anyone, including 
nonrafters, may apply to win a permit by lottery, and a post-lottery market for permits is allowed. 
 
In any of these cases, the demand for permits by rafters underlies the equilibrium characteristics of 
both the lottery and market.  We define rafters as individuals that place a positive value on a rafting 
permit --- that is, the set of individuals for whom demand is positive.   Think of rafters as being arranged 
in descending order of their valuation and, once our duckies are in a row, their valuations can be 
represented by a continuous, linear, downward sloping demand curve.
5   As Rumy and Hanke observe, 
in a simple market for permits (with no lottery involved), rafters would pay up to the net expected value 
of the rafting trip to obtain a permit to allow them to go rafting.  Therefore, the expected value of the 
permit itself is a direct reflection of the net value of rafting. 
 
The permit allocation process can be divided into two steps, the application step, and the redistribution 
step.  For the no-market alternative, the second step is disallowed. With a market, the second step 
involves trading between some lottery winners and would-be rafters.  People will only apply for a permit 
if their expected benefit of doing so outweighs the cost of applying.  This expectation is the probability 
of winning times the value of the permit to the winner, and the scenario that applicants face affects both 
of these elements.  Assuming a simultaneous random draw for each available permit, the probability of 
winning is the number of allocated permits divided by the number of applications. The value of the 
permit to the applicant is either the net value of a rafting trip or the expected market price for permits, 
whichever is greatest.  
 
For the analysis below we assume that the total cost of applying is the application fee.  Further, if a 
market is allowed, the market price of a permit will be equal to the marginal permit valuation for the 
marginal permit issued; that is, we assume a competitive market, and all transferred permits will be 
bought and sold at the market price.  In Figure 2,  p is the market price given total allocated permits q . 
 
The Permit Lottery with no Secondary Market 
Permit winners are chosen randomly from all applicants, and so with a secondary market prohibited, 
the expected aggregate value of the permits to rafters is the sum of the expected value for all 
applicants, represented by area B+C+D+E in Figure 2 minus the sum of the application fees.    There 
are two important consequences of the market restriction: 1) some of the nonwinners may value a 
permit more than some of the permit winners, and both permit winners and losers could be better off if 
trade between these rafters was allowed; 2) because nonrafters (by definition) would not want to use 
the permit themselves and are prohibited from selling them, no nonrafters will enter the lottery given the 
market prohibition. 
 
Rafter-Only Lottery with a Secondary Market 
Suppose, however, that only rafters (people who like rafting) are allowed to apply for the lottery.  The 
expected benefit of an application for a rafter in this setting is the maximum of the market price and the 
rafters individual permit value, times the probability of winning.  The cost of an application is still the 
application fee, and the individual will apply if the expected benefit is larger than the application cost.  
The market price will induce some half-hearted rafters to apply for a permit just to sell it, so there will be 
                                                 
5 A “duckie” is common name for a one-person raft. Western Economics Forum, April 2004 
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more applicants.  However, with more applicants, the probability of winning will decrease.  The marginal 
applicant will be that person for whom the expected value of obtaining a permit (market price times the 
































Figure 2:  Benefits from a random lottery are (B+C+D+E),  a rafter-only lottery with market (A+B+D+E), 
and an open lottery with market (A+B+D).  Area E is equivalent the value lost to non-rafters in an open 
lottery and market, given that E/(D+E) is the fraction of applicants who are nonrafters. The lottery with 
no market outperforms an open market from rafters’ perspective if  C+E-application fees > A- non-rafter 




Because rafters now have the ability to sell to other rafters in a secondary market, the value of a permit 
to a rafter will be the greater of the market price or the individual’s willingness to pay for the right to take 
a raft trip.  With the rafter-only secondary market, zealous lottery losers will buy permits from half-
hearted winners. The value of the traded permits is maximized because the highest valued users 
ultimately use them, and all the value of the right to take a trip is accrued by rafters.  Winners who 
choose to use the permit rather than sell them receive the same surplus as under the lottery-only 
scenario. The aggregate benefit of permits in the rafter-only market in Figure 2 is A+B+D+E. This total 
aggregate value will be higher with the secondary market than without, and all of it is accrued by rafters 
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An Open Permit Lottery with a Secondary Market 
If application for a permit is not restricted to rafters and permit trading is allowed after the lottery, the 
market price might induce nonrafters to apply for a permit for the sole purpose of selling it (just as a 
rafter-only market might induce half-hearted rafters to apply and sell).  In this open lottery case, an 
individual’s permit value is still the maximum of the value they place on a raft trip or the price they can 
receive in the market.  The market price of a permit will be the same with either type of secondary 
market ( p  in Figure 1).   Nonrafters will apply if the expected value of an application (the market price 
times the probability of winning a permit) is greater than the application fee. 
 
With an open secondary market, the aggregate value of permits to rafters will be less than in the rafter-
only lottery with a secondary market.  Rafters will be less likely to win a permit because nonrafters also 
submit applications, and some of the rafter surplus will be transferred from rafters to nonrafters.  This 
loss is equal to the market price times the number of winning nonrafters, and is equivalent to area E in 
Figure 2 given that the fraction of winners who are nonrafters is equal to E/(D+E). With this transfer of 
welfare to nonrafters, the total aggregate value of permits to rafters is less with the open secondary 
market than under a rafter-only lottery with market. 
 
The comparison between an open lottery and market and the current lottery for nontransferable permits 
is very interesting.   The aggregate value of permits to rafters in the open secondary market may be 
higher or lower than in the lottery market with no secondary market (which, remember, is the current 
policy).  The upside of allowing a secondary market was discussed above: rafters who win can sell to 
other rafters if the price is right, and rafters are therefore better off.   The downside is that nonrafters 
enter and extract some of the rents embodied in the market price of permits.  Considering  Figure 2 
again, the lottery with no secondary market outperforms the open market only if C+E – (total application 
fees) is greater than A – (application fees paid by rafters).  Which of these amounts outweighs the other 
is an empirical question that depends in large part on how many nonrafters are induced to apply in the 
initial lottery.  This fraction in turn depends on the size of application fee charged, the number of 
permits allotted, and the shape of the demand curve. 
 
Conclusions 
From the perspective of the resource users --- rafters in this case --- allowing a post-lottery market for 
permit trading is a double-edged sword.  Although such a market would allow rafters to trade permits 
among themselves and improve the aggregate value of river use to this stakeholder group as a whole, 
it also puts them in a position where they are less likely to win a permit in the initial lottery, and more 
likely to have to pay an individual to be able to raft these rivers --- someone who never had any 
intention of rafting in the first place, no less.  Although it is true that with a secondary market rafters will 
transfer some amount of surplus to nonrafters, it remains unclear whether rafters are better off with a 
market prohibition.   
 
Nonetheless, the lottery managers have at least two instruments that would affect the incentives to 
apply for permits:  the application fee and the number of allotted permits.  Changing the levels of these 
two policy instruments may change the share of applications, and therefore permits, that go to 
nonrafters, but using these instruments in such a way will have other ramifications for the distribution of 
user-group welfare as well. For example, higher lottery application fees or post-win permit charges 
could also be applied to through the Recreational Fee Demonstration Program for maintaining these 
beautiful river environments, which face substantial pressure almost entirely from rafters.   It remains to 
be seen if a market mechanism can be developed, even in theory, which might make use of the market 
in a politically expedient way. 
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There are a couple of reasons to think that a post-lottery market for rafters is more than just a useful 
hypothetical for understanding the losses to rafters associated with a rafter-only lottery.  First, if the goal 
were to allow a secondary market while restricting that market primarily to rafters, there may be ways to 
do so, at least to some extent.  For example, to be eligible to receive a permit for rafting the Grand 
Canyon, individuals are required to show some evidence of experience on comparable rivers.  Although 
this requirement is ostensibly implemented  for safety reasons,  evidence of experience  is also 
evidence  of prior interest,  and so could be interpreted as a signal that the individual is really a part of 
the “rafting community”.    Second, a lottery in Kansas has been designed explicitly for transfer of deer 
permits.  Fifty percent of all nonresident deer permits are set aside for a lottery for landowners, who 
then may sell these permits to hunters (Taylor and Marsh).  This case is particularly interesting not 
because of the similarities with rafting permits, but because of a big difference.  Kansas landowners are 
easily distinguishable from non-Kansas landowners (or Kansas nonlandowners).
6  If river rats were as 
easily flushed out, perhaps a post-lottery market would have been implemented by now. 
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